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“The most fundamental principle of all in gambling is simply equal conditions, e.g. of opponents,
of bystanders, of money, of situation, of the dice box, and of the die itself. To the extent which
you depart from that equality, if it is in your opponents favor, you are a fool, and if in your own,
you are unjust.”1
“The essence of gambling consists in an abandonment of reason, an inhibition of the factors of
human control.”2
Introduction
How much of what we do is the result of our will, and how much the result of chance or
luck or fortune? This is a decidedly un-decidable question, but one that needs to be asked. The
general assumption seems to be that a person’s “lot” in life is physically, morally, politically,
even romantically linked to choice.

But the use of the term “lot” betrays the underlying

uncertainty of what “causes” our “lot”, laying bare questions of responsibility, burden, and even
explanation. Much (perhaps at the very least 50% according to Machiavelli) of what happens in
our lives can be attributed to forces outside of our own will, and in that sense are not a result of
our choices. In this paper, we explain why the “Moral Luck” literature can be helpful as an
analogy to political theory even without the use of morality. In doing so, we also highlight how
radically close attention to the role of uncertainty, chance, and luck can undermine the ideals of
rationality, institution and control. By even examining the role of luck in political thinking, one
almost necessarily calls into question the very definition of what constitutes politics. Most
significantly, we will explain how the arguments of the “Moral Luck” theorists can inform
debates about redistribution in a democracy.
“Moral Luck” and the critique of the Kantian tradition
From our perspective, luck plays an important role in all aspects of life, affecting the type
of person one is, the situations one is in, and the choices one makes. However, morality (and
politics, which many conceive as based on a theory of morality) is often considered to be by
1

Ǿystein Ore, Cardano: The Gambling Scholar. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953 (page 189), quoting
Section 6 of Cardano’s Liber de ludo aleae.
2
John A. Hobson, “The Ethics of Gambling” in International Journal of Ethics Vol. 15 No. 2 (January 1905): 138.
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definition within the control of the individual agent; how can one assess responsibility and
therefore morality except by reference to agent choices? The use of the term “moral luck” calls
both the concept and method of morality into question. As Daniel Statman explains, “the idea of
one’s moral status being subject to luck seems almost unintelligible to most of us, and the
expression moral luck seems to be an impossible juxtaposition of two altogether different
concepts.”3 In developing moral luck, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel directly counter
Kantian morality which conceives of morality as immune to luck.

This treatment has brought

about a serious rethinking of the implications of morality in the political, social and economic
spheres, yet these luck-centered views have been controversial.

Statman underscores the

importance of moral luck in relation to larger issues: “The debate around moral luck turns mainly
around the question of whether and to what extent our moral notions of responsibility,
justification, blame, and so forth, are subject to luck.”4

In order to assess the framing of the

question, we should first understand the evolution of moral luck in relation to the Kantian
approach to morality.
Williams and Nagel criticize Kantian morality, the foundation of which is the superior
nature of the human will. Kant states, “Nothing in the world- indeed nothing even beyond the
world- can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except GOOD
WILL.”5 According to Kant, a good will (because of its independent nature) is in itself the object
of moral assessments.

By this understanding, it is unnecessary and irrelevant to consider

anything besides the will when making and assessing moral decisions. Kant argues that “The
good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its competence to
achieve some intended end: it is good only because of its willing (i.e. it is good in itself).”6 He
maintains that the will alone determines whether a moral choice is good or bad; the subsequent
3

Daniel Statman, Ed. Moral Luck. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993): 1
Statman 2.
5
Kant, cited in Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann. Modern Philosophy: Philosophical Classics. 3rd ed. Vol. 3.
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000): 606.
6
Baird and Kaufmann 607.
4
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effects of one’s choice have no relevance whatsoever. Dismissing potential consequences, he
explains that
Even if it should happen that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the
niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should be wholly lacking
in power to accomplish its purpose, and if even the greatest effort should not
avail it to achieve anything of its end, and if there remained only the good willnot as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all the means in our power- it will
sparkle like a jewel all by itself, as something that had its full worth in itself.7
While Kant regards the will as superior in status and removed from all effects and external
causes, however, his theory does not offer a clear explanation of why the will is superior and
removed from luck.

A chief omission in Kant’s theory is the lack of expectation for the

consequences and effects of both good and bad moral choices.
Williams, though not in agreement with Kant, recognizes the attractiveness of Kantian
theory. Williams explains the appeal:
The capacity for moral agency is supposedly present to any rational agent
whatsoever . . .The successfulness of moral life, removed from considerations of
birth, lucky upbringing. . .is presented as a career open not merely to the talents,
but to a talent which all rational beings necessarily possess to some degree. Such
a conception has an ultimate form of justice at its heart, and that is its allure.
Kantianism is only superficially repulsive- despite appearances, it offers an
inducement, solace to a sense of the world’s unfairness.8
Regardless, Williams is doubtful of the consolation Kantian morality can offer. He explains that
to claim that morality is immune to luck would also necessarily entail that one must also be at
least partially immune to luck through morality. This would inevitably be linking and altering “a
range of notions: rationality, justification, and ultimate or supreme value. The linkage between
those notions, under the Kantian conception, has a number of consequences for the agent’s
reflective assessment of his own actions. . .”9 Williams is critical of the “narrow and distorted”
nature of Kantian-inspired theories of morality and instead believes they should be abandoned for
7

Baird and Kaufmann 607.
Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981):
21.
9
Williams 1981: 21-22.
8
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something closer to the ancient Greek approach.10 Williams’ theory of morality focuses on
different types of luck and the agent’s self-reflection on moral decisions.
Williams’ Gauguin example helps to clarify the meaning of luck, luck’s effects, and selfreflection as a basis for moral evaluation. Gauguin is a professional painter with a family that
depends on him and Gauguin must make a crucial moral choice. Recognizing his talent, he must
choose between staying with his family and leaving his family to pursue his painting career.11
Williams sees Gauguin’s talent as “constitutive luck” in the sense that it is a reflection of
“motives, intentions, and personality” which are intuitive and require no further explanation.12 In
Gauguin’s case, a major difficulty in making his decision is the inability to know for certain
whether he will succeed or fail; whether painting will result in a living wage for him and his
family.

With this example, Williams is primarily concerned with exploring the idea of

justification or what makes Gauguin’s choice justified or unjustified retrospectively. He explains
that Gauguin “is putting a great deal on a possibility which has not unequivocally declared
itself.”13 The success or failure of Gauguin’s choice ultimately depends largely on luck. Statman
clarifies that will and talent “is not sufficient to make one a great artist…Hence, justification of
Gauguin’s decision depends on factors that are a matter of luck.”14 Furthermore, even if one is a
“great artist” one may still not be able to support a family, because beyond Gauguin’s constitutive
luck, other internal and external factors also affect the outcome of Gauguin’s decision and
justification.
Williams demonstrates that Gauguin can succeed or fail for different reasons; these
reasons are unforeseen and therefore independent of Gauguin’s moral choice from a Kantian
perspective. Williams offers one possibility of what can happen to Gauguin: “If Gauguin sustains
some injury on the way to Tahiti which prevents his ever painting again, that certainly means that
10

Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck” in Daniel Statman, Ed. Moral Luck. (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1993): 4.
11
Williams 1981: 23.
12
Williams 1993: 5.
13
Williams 1993:5.
14
Statman 5.
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his decision . . . was for nothing, and indeed there is nothing in the outcome to set against the
other people’s loss.”15 This series of events does not lead to the conclusion that Gauguin was
morally wrong and unjustified in his decision, rather it demonstrates that the project failed, not
that Gauguin himself failed.16 Williams understands this type of luck to be extrinsic, or external
to the agent, in that it does not “unjustify” the agent’s decision. Yet, if the cause of Gauguin’s
failure were more internal, or intrinsic, Williams would claim that Gauguin would not be justified
in his decision.17 Despite this important characteristic, Williams’ analysis is in contradistinction
to Kantian morality. Though intrinsic luck may depend in some ways on the agent, this does not
imply that the will of the agent or the agent alone is unaffected by luck as Kant’s theory implies.
A particular improvement of Williams’ moral theory is the means by which one can be
justified, which is different from justification itself.

Most theories rely on an objective

justification; however, Williams believes that justification should be personal. In the Gauguin
example, he explains:
Even if Gauguin can be ultimately justified, that need not provide him with any
way of justifying himself to others, or at least to all others. Thus he may have no
way of bringing it about that those who suffer from his decision will have no
justified ground for reproach. Even if he succeeds, he will not acquire a right
that they accept what he has to say; if he fails, he will not even have anything to
say.18
Because moral judgments are generally thought to be universal and objective, Williams has been
criticized for his reliance on self-justification. The major objection is about the relationship
between personal and objective justification: if a moral choice is right for me, it is right for others
in similar circumstances as well, so there should be no problem justifying a moral choice in an
objective sense. Nagel, for example, claims that if a moral decision cannot be justified
objectively, then it is not a moral decision.

15

Williams 1981: 25.
Williams 1981: 25.
17
Williams 1981: 25-26.
18
Williams 1981: 23-24.
16
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Williams responds in two ways to critics of his idea of self-justification. First, he claims
that it is only by the modern (Kantian) theory of morality that what is “moral” is defined so
strictly. Secondly, Williams believes that the objection raised by Nagel and others is unwarranted
because, “The idea that there has been a moral cost [known by the demand for justification] itself
implies that something bad has been done, and very often, that someone has been wronged, and if
the people who have been wronged do not accept the justification, then no-one can demand that
they should.”19 Rather than focusing on what he thinks is a misplaced demand for justification,
Williams wants to highlight the effects of luck at all stages of moral decision making, particularly
those ignored by Kant.
Self-justification is the foundation for examining moral choices and deciding what was
justified or unjustified based on an agent’s decision and certain kinds of luck. For Williams the
retrospective self-justification of an unjustified moral decision is “agent-regret, which a person
can feel only toward past actions . . . Agent-regret requires not merely a first-personal subjectmater, nor yet merely a particular kind of psychological content, but also a particular kind of
expression.”20 This specific type of expression involves some desire to compensate for past
actions. As an example of agent-regret Williams describes the feelings of a lorry driver who kills
a child and compares the driver’s feelings to the feelings of a spectator. The lorry driver will
obviously feel agent-regret, while the bystander may feel only regret. The distinction between
regret and agent-regret is that the past participation in an action involves feelings of personal
responsibility or blame.21

Williams describes this difference: “In these cases the relevant

consciousness of having done the harmful thing is basically that of its having happened as a
consequence of one’s acts, together with the thought that the cost of its happening can in the
circumstances fairly be allocated to one’s account.”22 Self-justification and agent-regret are

19

Williams 1981: 37.
Williams 1981: 27.
21
Williams 1981: 28.
22
Williams 1981: 28.
20
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inevitably subject to luck, but the feelings of agent-regret are normal. This normative claim
suggests that all rational people should experience agent-regret as a consequence of harmful
actions.
In an attempt to clarify his occasionally confusing approach, Williams explains the
source of misunderstanding and separates his theory into three major questions in a Postscript to
Statman’s Moral Luck. Williams writes:
The most important source of misunderstanding in Moral Luck was that I raised,
as I now think, three different issues at once. . . One was the question . . . how
important is morality in the narrow sense as contrasted with a wider sense of the
ethical? The second question concerns the importance, for a given agent and for
our view of certain agents, of the ethical even in the wider sense . . . The third
question raised in the article is that of retrospective justification, and this is the
widest, because it can arise beyond the ethical, in any application of practical
rationality.23
The first question is answered with the example of the lorry driver. Williams explains that a
narrow or modern-Kantian morality is worthless. So, debating whether or not the lorry driver’s
feelings of regret are moral feelings is only an attempt to make morality too narrowly defined and
misses the point of the analysis. The second question is examined in the Gauguin example, “a
story that invites reflection on the placing of ethical concerns- even in the wider sense- among
values and, more broadly, among other human needs and projects.”24 The second question also
deals with the “imperialist” nature of ethical concerns; Williams, again, is being highly critical of
the objective and universal understanding of morality.

The third question, dealing with

retrospective justification and self-criticism is answered by Williams in a way that makes moral
self-assessment of unjustified decisions not only possible, but necessary.
These three questions are the foundation of Williams’ moral theory and are extremely
complicated in themselves, but it is evident they can not be completely isolated. These questions
are interrelated and require not only a greater understanding of morality, but also a general

23
24

Williams 1993: 9, 255.
Williams 1993: 9.
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rethinking of Kantian theory, as Williams advocates. Williams emphasizes the importance of
moral luck in each of these questions, demonstrating how it “penetrates into the practical realm”
of morality, ethics, and rational agency.25 By understanding Williams’ intentions and exploring
moral luck, “we may be able to penetrate the misplaced reassurances that morality offers, and ride
ourselves of some of the perplexities that it encourages.”26 By embracing this “moral hazard”
that Kantian morality---through a priori justification---attempts to eliminate, a more complete and
accurate sense of moral responsibility and justification can be gained.
Nagel’s Paradox
Like Williams, Nagel conceives of morality as subject to luck. Nagel explains that “Kant
believed that good and bad luck should influence neither our moral judgment of a person and his
actions, nor his moral assessment of himself.”27 Nagel interprets Kantian morality to involve no
risk, because moral decisions are based on the will, which the agent has complete control over,
with neither the will nor the moral agent being subject to luck.28 Nagel has an appealing view on
assigning moral responsibility and what exactly is within or beyond our control and thereby
presumably blameworthy:
This [Kantian] view seems to be wrong, but it arises in response to a fundamental
problem about moral responsibility to which we possess no satisfactory solution.
The problem develops out of the ordinary condition of moral judgment. Prior to
reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for
what is not their fault, or for what is due to other factors beyond their control . . .
when we blame someone for his actions we are not merely saying it is bad that
they happened, or bad that he exists: we are judging him, saying he is bad, which
is different from his being a bad thing. Without being able to explain exactly
why, we feel that the appropriateness of moral assessment is easily undermined
by the discovery that the act or attribute, no matter how good or bad, is not under
the person’s control.29
Kant’s theory of moral responsibility and blame are deeply rooted in philosophical tradition and
general understandings of morality. It is difficult to diverge from this overwhelming sense of
25

Statman 10.
Williams1993: 257-258.
27
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): 24.
28
Nagel 24-26.
29
Nagel 25.
26
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responsibility and control by the will while ignoring all factors external to the will and claiming
no responsibility for them. By disregarding everything except the will, morality and explanations
for moral decisions are incomplete. Nagel emphasizes one of the central flaws in Kantian
morality: “What we do depends in many more ways . . . on what is not under our control- what is
not produced by a good or bad will, in Kant’s phrase.”30 To account for luck or general
circumstances beyond the will, Nagel creates his own counter-Kantian moral theory.
Nagel’s seemingly minor theoretical differences amount to much greater implications
when applied practically.

He believes that moral justification must be justification in the

objective sense and also that one cannot be held morally responsible and blameworthy for results
that occurred without contributing to their occurrence, both of which Williams rejected.31 The
implications of Nagel’s view would necessitate a universal understanding of justification and a
greater focus on the voluntary aspect of moral decisions in their subsequent evaluation. Nagel
has a significantly different understanding of the examples of moral luck that Williams presented,
clearly demonstrating the differences of their theories.
Nagel does not consider Williams’ lorry driver example to be a case of moral luck
because the driver was not acting in either a moral or immoral manner. Instead, Nagel simply
calls this an example of luck because the driver exhibited no degree of negligence on his part (i.e.
he did not personally contribute to the cause of the accident in any way). Nagel explains this
difference between luck and moral luck particularly in this example: “if the driver was guilty of
even a minor degree of negligence- failing to have his breaks checked recently, for example- then
if the negligence contributes to the death of the child, he will not merely feel terrible. He will
blame himself for the death.”32

Nagel’s understanding adds another element to analyzing

consequences, namely, whether or not the agent made a careless decision, in addition to the
accidental element of a child running into the road. Nagel offers his own examples similar to that
30

Nagel 25.
Nagel 10.
32
Nagel 29.
31
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of the lorry driver. In his drunk driver example, Nagel claims that there is no difference in the
degree of negligence in a drunk driver swerving and hitting nothing and a drunk driver swerving
and killing several people.33 In both scenarios the driver is guilty of the same level of negligence--driving drunk---but the difference is a matter of chance; swerving and hitting nothing, or hitting
several people. Nagel categorizes the drunk driver examples as decisions involving negligence,
and in so doing distinguishes acts of negligence from decisions made under uncertainty.
Nagel believes that in particular circumstances, it is possible to assess some moral
decisions prospectively and retrospectively, though some “certain things are so bad in themselves,
or so risky, that no results can make them all right. Nevertheless, when moral judgment does
depend on the outcome, it is objective and timeless and not dependant on a change of standpoint
produced by success or failure.”34 This understanding of justification makes moral assessment
completely objective and much more difficult to attain than by Williams’ standard of justification.
This is the second point on which Williams and Nagel’s theories differ drastically, with Williams’
idea of self-justification being wholly subjective and determined only retrospectively.
Not only do Williams and Nagel disagree on what can be called moral and whether
justification must be objective or subjective, but Nagel also delineates four particular forms of
luck. The first form, constitutive luck, can impact the decision of a driver to drive drunk, or
Gauguin’s choice of career over family because it refers to “the kind of person you are, where this
is not just a question what you deliberately do, but your inclinations, capacities, and
temperament.”35 The second, circumstantial luck is “the kind of problems and situations one
faces.”36 An example of circumstantial luck is being in Nazi Germany during the time of Hitler’s
rule as opposed to living in the United States in 2006.

Clearly a moral agent in these two

circumstances will face different moral decisions simply as a matter of course. Relatedly, the

33

Nagel 29.
Nagel 31.
35
Nagel 28.
36
Nagel 28.
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third is causal luck or “the way one is determined by antecedent circumstances.”37 Finally,
resultant luck refers to “the way one’s actions and projects turn out.”38 The example of the
several people being on the sidewalk or no one being on the sidewalk when the drunk driver
swerves, is an instance of resultant luck.

Perceiving these four different forms of luck as

sometimes interrelated, but more importantly independent of one another has significant
implications for the general acceptance of moral luck. Because Nagel places luck into four
distinct categories, critics of moral luck must refute each form of luck in a given situation.
Therefore, though Nagel’s alteration of Williams’ general luck principle has not resolved all of its
difficulties it has strengthened the case for the plausibility of moral luck.
Conceptualizing morality as subject to luck involves a real paradox according to Nagel.
He explains, “The view that moral luck is paradoxical is not a mistake, ethical or logical, but a
perception of one of the ways in which the intuitively acceptable conditions of moral judgment
threaten to undermine it all.”39

This paradox, as Nagel recognizes it, involves a complex

understanding of moral justification and blame, in that affirming moral luck can lead to a lack of
agent responsibility. Statman clarifies this paradoxical understanding: “On one hand, we believe
that one can be held responsible only for what is under one’s control and recognize the bitter truth
that luck is everywhere, so that ‘eventually nothing remains to be ascribed to the responsible
self.”40 Nagel himself does not claim to have a solution to the paradox of moral luck but rather
thinks that the problem must be understood in terms of internal moral agency and other types of
value. As he puts it, “The degree to which the problem has a solution can be determined only by
seeing whether in some degree the incompatibility between this conception and the various ways
in which we do not control what we do is only apparent.”41 It is because Nagel believes moral
justification must be objective that he finds himself in this dilemma. For Williams, the self37

Nagel 28.
Nagel 28.
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11

12
justification principle allows him to avoid some of the difficulties of objective justification and
the insolvable paradox. Williams believes, instead, that the paradox is in “our conception of
reality.”42
Moral Luck after (and before) Williams and Nagel
Martha Nussbaum looks backward to explore conceptions of reality and therefore the
existence of moral luck in ancient Greek thought. She sees two competing views in this regard.
On the one hand, in most of Plato’s dialogues he attempted to negate the effects of luck on the
good life, while Aristotle, on the other hand, embraced the idea of luck and came up with a
“mixed” theory whereby some aspects of life were subject to luck and others immune to luck.
Nussbaum explains that the ancient Greeks “believed that the excellence of a good person is
something of that person’s own, for whose possession and exercise that person can appropriately
be held accountable.”43 This concept of “excellence” is analogous to Kant’s understanding of the
good will. What is interesting about at least one ancient Greek view is that it presupposes a
certain foundation or set of lucky circumstances: “We need to be born with adequate capabilities,
to live in fostering natural and social circumstances, to stay clear of abrupt catastrophe, to
develop confirming associations with other human beings.”44 This understanding of morality
being immune to luck or “fortune,” however, was not held by all ancient Greeks. For example, in
Pindar’s poem, he explains the impact of luck: “Our openness to fortune and our sense of value,
here again, both render us dependent on what is outside of us.”45 Because of this external
determination, there is a need in times of hardship to rely on others.
Nussbaum interprets Pindar’s poem to conceive of life as subject to luck in some
instances and immune to luck in others.

Yet, Pindar, like Kant, believes that reason and

rationality place humans in a superior category, affording them the ability to overcome luck and
42

Williams 1993: 237.
Martha Nussbaum, “Luck and Ethics” in Statman, Daniel, Ed. Moral Luck. (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1993): 73. See also Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1986)
44
Nussbaum 73.
45
Nussbaum 74.
43

12

13
negate its negative effects.46 To better understand the Greek treatment of moral luck, Nussbaum
formulates three general questions. First, “How much should a rational plan of life allow for
elements such as friendship, love, political activity, attachment to property or possessions, all of
which, being themselves vulnerable, make the person who stakes his or her good to them
similarly open to chance?”47 It is difficult to conceive of a life devoid of all the above mentioned
relationships; to call this life “good” without vulnerabilities would be contrary to most
preferences.

Second, do the elements of love, friendship, political activity and attachment

“coexist harmoniously, or are they capable, in circumstances not of the agent’s own making, of
generating conflicting requirements that can themselves impair the goodness of the agent’s
life?”48 In order to eliminate all possibility of conflict or risk involved in these components the
agent’s life would have to be much less attached and fulfilling. Lastly, Nussbaum questions the
relationship between the “self-sufficiency and the more ungovernable parts of the human being’s
internal makeup . . . the ethical value of the so called ‘irrational parts of the soul.’”49 From these
three general questions, it is clear that Nussbaum believes that luck can not be avoided or
dismissed by ancient Greek understanding.
In this sense, Aristotle recognizes the high price of a life immune to luck, and disagrees
with the Platonic drive to eliminate it. Nussbaum explains that Aristotle does not find character
alone to be sufficient for the good life; rather a moral agent must perform actions. Aristotle
composes a long list of instances of luck, which are not remarkable examples but occurrences that
are common. Plato’s understanding of luck impacting the good life is distinct from Aristotle’s,
but in many ways similar to Kantian formulations. As Nussbaum explains, “For Plato, the good
person could not be harmed by the world: his life is no less good and praiseworthy because of
adverse circumstances.”50 In this sense Plato and Kant have similar moral theories. Going back
46

Nussbaum 75.
Nussbaum 79.
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Nussbaum 79.
50
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to what Aristotle calls the “price” of a life without of luck, acceptance of the Platonic moral
theory would entail giving up any form of moral risk, including all relationships and dependency.
Essentially, limiting one’s vulnerability would also limit and negatively affect one’s character and
one’s ability to have the good life. Aristotle compares the nature of human life to that of a plant,
holding that the condition of moral risk is necessary to recognize its goodness: “Its yielding and
open posture towards the world gives it the fragility, as well as the beauty, of a plant.”51 There is
desirability to this fragility that other, more contemporary, theorists have picked up on.
In order to defend this fragility Margaret Urban Walker explores the possibility of two
distinct worlds, one existing with luck and risk and other without. She calls morality being
subject to luck impure agency and morality immune to luck pure agency.52 Her basic claim is
that a world of pure agency would be a horrible place to live because it would have hyperindividualistic people concerned with only the intention of their decisions, ignoring the actual
consequences or results of luck. A world of pure agency would be filled with suffering and lack
of care, because people would justifiably ignore the negative results of their actions.53 Statman
explains that in the world of impure agency “we can rely on each other in ongoing projects, and
we need not fear that or friends will let us down when we need them, even if our need was not
something that was within our control.”54 The three primary virtues of impure agency are
integrity, grace, and lucidity, according to Walker. Therefore, on this account, a world with
moral luck is more desirable and morally consistent.
Walker explains how her own work is indebted to Nussbaum’s work on ancient Greek
approaches to moral luck.

For Walker, Nussbaum reveals “how the wish to deny or contain

moral vulnerability is a philosophical quest as old as the Western tradition.”55 Clearly, the results
of one’s actions should be assessed in a way that did not concentrate on the will or “wish” alone.
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This understanding also complicates traditional understandings of causality and responsibility and
how blame can be applied. Walker explains
The fact is that our perfectly predictable entanglement in a causally complex
world, with imperfectly predictable results . . . this fact requires us to understand
and respond to our actual situation of being at moral risk; that is, of being subject
to assessment both for results of what we have (uncontroversially) done and for
what our actions under circumstances morally fraught, where these results and
circumstances are determined in important part by luck.56
According to Walker, the impure agents bear a great burden of responsibility for circumstances
beyond their control. However, this state of weighty consequence and blame is far better than
one denying luck and responsibility. A world of impure agency leaves the moral agent open to
vast possibilities of luck and risk. This vulnerability requires a dependence on one another,
which, as Walker explains, is a highly attractive. She states, “To the extent that these agents are
people of integrity, they will not fail us, even under the blows of bad . . . to the extent that we
ourselves are such agents and possess integrity, we can depend, morally, on ourselves even in a
bad spot.”57 Like Nussbaum, Walker believes that a theory which recognizes and accounts for
moral luck is necessary.
Consequences of Moral Luck for Just Desert and Distributive Justice
Moral luck drastically alters the concepts of praise and blame which have been central for
determining a just system of distribution from the liberal perspective. Walker’s notion of pure
agency, with the maximum reliance on self and independence, is in some ways consistent with
the libertarian and liberal theories of justice; these approaches to political theory rest on an almost
unconditional conception of the self as a locus of control. However, just as traditional Kantian
morality is altered by moral luck, the traditional approach to distributive justice (liberal theory)
should incorporate luck and chance as well. The role of luck in moral theory and distributive
justice is related, in both cases generating divergent attitudes to reward, punishment, equality and
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fairness from more established conceptions. This can be seen most clearly in the case of John
Rawls, considered by many to be the most important political thinker of the 20th century. Not
coincidentally, Rawls situates his own work in the Kantian tradition of moral thinking. While his
main concern is for political equality, the issues of morality and economics interact in important
ways with how we should conceptualize political life.
For Rawls economic inequality clearly has an effect on political and social equality.58 In
refashioning the social contract in order to justify principles of a liberal democratic welfare state
and ostensibly move beyond utilitarianism and intuitionism, Rawls is justly seen as one of the
most important contributors to political philosophy in the twentieth century.

In order to

reformulate the social contract along these lines, Rawls uses a counterfactual of the “original
position” in which we all imagine that we live under a “veil of ignorance” as to our actual
chances in life vis-à-vis our talents. This is clearly inaugurated as a way to imagine a just society
where talents may be rewarded, but fairly in the sense that talents are not the basis for infringing
on the liberties of others. From this veil we can conceive of a set of principles that would order
society in the fairest way. For Rawls the use of the “veil of ignorance” enables a fair conception
of society to emerge. By imagining that we do not know our own talents or our propensity to
risk, we can imagine a distribution of social goods that would be fair to everyone. In this way, he
deduces the “difference principle” whereby
All social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless any or all of these
goods is to the advantage of the least favored.59
In this sense Rawls is not concerned with removing all inequalities, but only those that would not
benefit the least well-off. Because there may be a conflict of interest in what benefits are
received regarding one least-advantaged group over another, Rawls establishes a priority by
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which we can judge. Priority is first given to liberty, which can only be restricted for the sake of
liberty, that is, it can only be restricted if it “strengthen[s] the total system of liberty shared by all”
and is acceptable to those who will have less liberty.60 Similarly, any inequality of opportunity
must “enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity” and “an excessive rate of
saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing the hardship.”61
Rawls’ view of individuals motivates his conception of justice. Because of this, his
concern at all times is to respect individuals as ends and not means in the Kantian tradition of
moral thinking. Rawls’ concern is that under present conditions, much of the earned benefits of
individuals are not morally significant in that they can be reduced to being a product of luck.
I have tried to show that once we try to find a rendering of [the two principles]
which treats everyone equally as a moral person, and which does not weight
man’s share in the benefits and burdens of social cooperation according to their
social fortune or their luck in the natural lottery, it is clear that the democratic
interpretation is the best choice among the four alternatives.62
The motivation behind retaining certain inequalities as just, if they work to the advantage of the
less well off, is that it rewards individuals based on their choices in life rather than their initial
endowments. But from the initial position under the veil of ignorance, one cannot predict what
choices one will make nor what advantages they will have in life. As a result, Rawls argues that
the rational individual, from this standpoint, will adopt a “maximin” strategy. This is the rational
position because everyone in it will want to ensure that they have the best possible access to
primary goods and in so doing will choose a principle of justice that maximizes said goods if one
ends up being in the minimum, or least well-off, position.63
Commitments to egalitarianism, such as Rawls’, can justify an unequal distribution of
wealth with recourse to such conceptions of merit and talent. Elizabeth Anderson suggests that
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many contemporary equality-based arguments run counter to an egalitarian impulse in this sense.
She asks, “if much recent academic work defending equality had been secretly penned by
conservatives, could the results be any more embarrassing for egalitarians?”64 One of the many
critiques that she offers focuses on the tendency of such theorizing to be “too narrowly focused
on the distribution of divisible, privately appropriated goods, such as income and resources, or
privately enjoyed goods such as welfare.”65 In this sense she suggests that they stray away from
actually existing egalitarian movements, which have “much broader agendas.”66 She traces this
focus back to the themes we have been developing: the domination of the view that the point of
equality is to “compensate people for undeserved bad luck.”67 Rather, she argues that this is a
mistaken view of the point of equality, which is “not to eliminate the impact of brute luck from
human affairs, but to end oppression, which by definition is socially imposed.”68 Further, the aim
is not to make sure that everyone gets what they deserve, but rather “to create a community in
which people stand in relations of equality to others.”69
The issue of luck and the question of desert have been central to theorizing equality and
from Anderson’s perspective this explains the poverty of the concept of equality today. The
question of equality in this sense is really one of inequality: what types of inequality are permitted
(ones that are a result of desert) and what kinds are not (those that result from luck). This then
becomes the basis of a redistributive scheme whereby it is assumed that redistribution will, or
could, help equalize that portion of a person’s income that results from luck while preserving that
which is deserved because of hard work. What makes this paradigm possible is the centrality of a
notion of “choice” in liberal-democratic theory generally. The idea that we should be rewarded
(and punished) for our choices has a complicated place in these discussions.
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For Rawls and other liberal thinkers (including Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick), a
certain amount of inequality is to be accepted because otherwise we are not respecting people’s
choices or talents. In one reading this is merely a Kantian desire to regard persons as ends and
not means, thereby taking seriously people’s own choices as indicative of their desires with full
knowledge of repercussions. Within a vast array of positions, Elizabeth Anderson points out that
many theorists with a strong commitment to egalitarianism nevertheless accept inequalities that
result from adults’ voluntary choices. In this sense they
place great stress on the distinction between the outcomes for which an
individual is responsible—that is, those that result from her voluntary choices—
and the outcomes for which she is not responsible—good or bad outcomes that
occur independent of her choice or of what she could have reasonably foreseen.
Luck egalitarians dub this the distinction between “option luck” and “brute
luck.”70
She links this discussion particularly to Ronald Dworkin and his insurance scheme, pointing out
that this paradigm views the welfare state as “a giant insurance company that insures its citizens
against all forms of bad luck.”71 Thus redistributive taxes are a form of “insurance premiums
against bad luck.”72
Not coincidentally, what motivates this is at least partly a desire to preserve risk-taking.
In the sense in which it is used here, risk means the idea that a person takes chances by making
certain decisions that could end up hurting them, though they may make the decisions based on a
calculus in which they assume they will not.

People are conceptualized as inherently

conservative, to the extent that they will not necessarily make choices that could hurt them. The
idea is that making risky choices is what propels progress and change. This is a desire to preserve
risk-taking in that it is commonly believed that risk-taking is at the heart of what makes capitalist
economics superior in producing economic growth. Anderson identifies four specific ways in
which such risk-oriented thinking impinges on arguments for equality.

The first is that it
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abandons negligent victims, as in the case of a faulty driver who has no insurance but is hooked
up to a respirator as a result of an accident that was ostensibly caused by her. Anderson cites
Rakowski as arguing “the faulty driver has no claim of justice to continued medical care.”73
Similarly, the state is required to make special accommodations for the disabled, unless their
disability is the result of their own faulty behavior.74 Anderson calls this discrimination among
the disabled. Further, there is the issue of geographic choices, as in those citizens that choose to
live near a fault line or in an area with a high likelihood of hurricanes: a geographical
discrimination among citizens. Lastly, there is the issue of occupational discrimination, as in the
case of people who choose to be engaged in very dangerous work, such as mining or the armed
forces. In all of these cases, Anderson critiques the “egalitarian” impulse that puts too much
emphasis on people’s choices as too unsympathetic and as working against the underlying point
of equality as she sees it.75 This is because the idea of risk-taking is seen as liable to create just
rewards, but also just punishments. In the cases cited above, just punishments include lack of
medical attention, lack of state assistance in rebuilding one’s home, lack of handicapped services,
and lack of worker’s compensation for injury. Had the risks not turned out negatively, the same
people would have been rewarded with insurance-free driving (at a lower cost), homes in places
with ostensibly lower rent or mortgage payments, or in the case of the workers in high risk jobs,
ostensibly higher income as a result of doing difficult and dangerous jobs.76 The flip side of
punishing risk-dependent problems should be entitlement to risk-dependent good fortune.
Anderson’s intervention into debates on equality raises fundamental questions about the
egalitarian project, as we know it. In an important respect it calls into question the notion of
“choice” that is central to Rawls, Dworkin, and Nozick. As she points out, “free choice within a
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set of options does not justify the set of options itself.”77 The problem with relying on market
decisions as a basis for standards of equality is that “people’s real or hypothetical market choices
offer no guidance whatsoever to what citizens are obligated to provide one another on a collective
basis.”78 Furthermore, she points out, following Hayek, that merit-based systems of equality have
the effect of making people uniquely accountable to other people’s standard of what kinds of
decisions they should have made with their life.79

That is, a person could be subject to the

judgment that she may have “wasted her talent” in the eyes of another, though there may be
perfectly good reasons that she decided to forego a market wage for whatever talent she allegedly
wasted.80 Such standards of equality also raise fundamental questions about non-wage work.
The hypothetical individuals in the equality-based arguments she critiques seem to be
autonomous in the sense that they do not go through major periods of dependency or care for
others. However, as Anderson points out, “long periods of dependency on other’s care taking are
a normal and inevitable part of everyone’s life cycle.”81 Many feminist theorists have brought
this issue more concretely to the fore, showing how non-wage work, especially care taking, which
significantly tends to be done by women, is undervalued in political theory. As Nagel explains,
Rawls’ egalitarian theory is not just because the final distribution itself depends so heavily on
luck. Nagel recognizes the problem with both moral and economic thought that does not include
luck: “A moral view that gives no weight to the value of overall outcomes cannot be correct.”82
Nagel contends that no more weight should be given to opportunity than equal outcomes, because
luck in many ways is inherent in opportunity itself.
Another example of how attention to luck can impact the assumptions and models of
liberal thinkers is the case of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia. Here Nozick advocates
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for a minimal state that violates the rights of the least amount of individuals. He believes that
what an individual earns through their labor and mixing of resources, should not be redistributed.
This theory emerges from the concept that an individual has a value, for example natural talent,
and an individual is entitled to all that they earn from the sale of their talent. Nozick completely
ignores the prospect of compensating for factors beyond an individual’s control, instead focusing
only on merit.
Nozick offers a famous but suspect example dealing with the relationship of luck, desert,
and redistributive justice: African-American basketball player Wilt Chamberlain. This example
ostensibly illustrates how the luck of possessing an advantageous talent can result in a greater
amount of wealth. Nozick, however, does not understand talent to be a product of luck.83
Instead, he conceptualizes a theory of entitlement, with talent being the result of merit or moral
desert. This theory of entitlement underlies Nozick’s greater understanding of a just distribution
of wealth, namely, one in which each person is entitled to the rewards of their talent. Clearly, this
theory of distributive justice fails to account for certain individuals being more or less deserving
of talent. Like Nozick, most contemporary theorists have either neglected to consider luck’s
influence in distributive justice or attempted to account for luck in ways that aim to negate its
perceived benefits. In the example of Wilt Chamberlain, this denial or attempt to abolish luck
would either take the form of allowing Chamberlain to keep all of his profits or redistributing a
portion of his profits, neither of which is satisfactory according to Nozick.84 Barbara Fried offers
an alternative interpretation of the Wilt Chamberlain example.

In essence, Fried claims

Chamberlain deserves only a portion of the money he earns from the sale of his basketball talent.
Without society and social preference for Chamberlain’s talents, it would not matter how talented
Chamberlain was because he would generate no income. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that some of the money that society contributed to realizing Chamberlain’s basketball talent
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should go back to society in the form of redistributed wealth.
Fried, unlike Nozick, recognizes the tremendous effects of luck. She explains that Wilt
Chamberlain owes a great deal of his natural talent to luck, even though he has mixed labor with
his talent to produce income. His natural talent is a product of luck, which he did nothing to
deserve, and society has contributed to his income by adding value to his talent.85 Without the
societal preference of Chamberlain’s talent, it would not be as valuable or exploitable. Therefore,
society should have some claim to the value of his talent because it had a hand in creating the
value. This theory attempts to diminish some of the huge disparities in luck, and produce greater
equality. If an individual has such good luck, as Chamberlain does, and did nothing under his
own control to deserve this luck, he has an obligation to share some of the surplus value of his
income with those who are not as lucky.86 Fried emphasizes this point: “Chamberlain is wealthier
the moment he is born.”87 When compared to any other individual born without basketball talent,
Fried raises the question of which person’s situation is more desirable. This choice is obvious, no
matter how hard others who have an average level of basketball talent work, they will never be
able to achieve the level of success or wealth that Chamberlain enjoys. Therefore, basing
principles of desert on merit alone is a false notion, because merit itself involves at least some
luck.
When considering the worth of Chamberlain’s talent it is important to recognize that this
is very much a product of what society deems desirable or undesirable, which is partly why the
use of Wilt Chamberlain is suspect given the disparities of income according to race and gender
in American society. Because possessing an exceptional basketball skill is a highly desirable
talent in this context, the argument goes, it should be rewarded accordingly.88

Yet, this

understanding makes an implicit claim about individuals who possess undesirable characteristics
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as well. For example, a person born with a disability or even “average” is not rewarded in the
same way as the exceptionally talented individual. The relationship between what is highly
valued in a given society and the level of reward given for that value is very strong. This
conception highly favors individuals who are categorized as possessing an advantageous
characteristic; by our account this is a result of luck.
Luck, Fortune, and the challenge to politics
The treatment of luck within contemporary theories of morality and distributive justice
demonstrate a theoretical trend that counters the traditional approaches that dismiss or downplay
the role of luck. This new conception involves a rethinking of responsibility for what is beyond
an individual’s control. Williams and Nagel, as articulators of the concept of “moral luck”, also
formulate new definitions of justification, praise and blame that go beyond consideration of the
will as the foundation of morality. Understanding morality as subject to luck disputes the Kantian
tradition that ignores all consequences beyond a moral agent’s control. These same ideas applied
to distributive justice produce a similar trend in countering Rawls’ merit principle. Like Kant,
Rawls believes that factors beyond an individual’s control should not have any bearing on social,
economic and political distribution. Rawls claims merit should be the primary determinant of a
just distribution of wealth, because desert is predicated on merit, and merit itself is not subject to
luck. Contemporary theorists have demonstrated the flaws within traditional theories that deny
luck and criticize their unjust and unequal outcomes: two excellent examples are Iris Marion
Young and Nancy Fraser.89 Both theorists articulate excellent critiques in examples of socially
constructed ideas of worth and desirability. But it seems only recently that market determinations
of talent and merit have been recognized as contingent on luck. The theory of moral luck ignites
a positive trend in political thought, generating more complete and accurate understandings of
agent responsibility and control. By applying this understanding to distributive justice we can see
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a paradigm concerned with the inevitable inequality of luck, though often ill-equipped to face up
to the fundamental rethinking of politics that this admission would require.
A politics that is sensitive to luck, or those contingencies beyond our control, faces many
challenges, though.

Machiavelli, on the cusp of the modern era, famously explains the

importance of Fortune in our lives; “events beyond our conjecture” often seem to control us, he
says, but “in order not to wipe out our free will, I consider it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter
of one half our actions, but that she still leaves the control of the other half, or almost that, to
us.”90 For Machiavelli, though, Fortune is distinguished from God (Dio) and he leaves the
question of providential design mostly open. We can see, however, from his discussion of
Fortune that Machiavelli is urgently endorsing a space for human will, and believed that Fortune
and free will co-exist in a way that free will cannot co-exist with Providential design.91
Machiavelli’s views on the role of Fortune and will in human life were notorious in his
time, but they continue to be controversial or at least misunderstood. For example, one scholar of
Renaissance Italy writes that “In history, Fortune operated through a multiplicity of possible
causes, agents and effects; because of this confusion, she opposed herself to reason and free will,
and her intervention absolved men of the responsibility for the course of events.”92 The idea that
Fortune absolves men of responsibility may continue to be widely assumed, but it is not accurate.
Though Fortune cannot be predicted or controlled, as Machiavelli argues it can be resisted and
manipulated. Machiavelli’s conception of virtù is that skill or quality that confronts Fortune, not
letting it control one’s entire life.

This skill of virtù may be useless with regards to the

Providential order, because if there is a Providential design then most certainly there can be no
manipulation of it by the individual. Whatever is contained in the Providential order may be
unknown and outside the control of the individual, but moreover if one believes one is controlling
90
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or resisting one is merely mistaken. But for Machiavelli not all aspects outside of our control are
Providential. In this respect he was ahead of his time.
Other thinkers were able to hold in tension the idea of providential design and fortune in
perhaps a less consistent, but more widespread way.

As Jonathan Walker explains it

“Eighteenth-century rationalists…claim[ed] that physical laws (of motion, and such) determined
the fall of the die or the distribution of the cards; the operation of such laws was, of course,
predetermined in a general rather than a specific sense by God.”93 In this sense, the belief seems
to be that God generally controls the workings of the world, but that within that small concerns
like the fall of the die (or the picking of the lot) are less determined. In this conception, gambling
was a like a contract among players “regulated according to principles of natural law—the
emphasis was not on the mechanism of causation but on the agreement to redistribute money on
the basis of the outcome.”94 The very reason why gamblers might meet and engage in this
contract—that it was not causally predetermined—is also simultaneously the reason why the
gambling situation itself is considered fair.
Secularizing Providential Design and the Role of Probability in Gambling
The relationship between determinism and free will became increasingly complicated
during the Enlightenment, and particularly in its political consequences. But most of the issues
that emerge during that time did have historical antecedent.

The best example of this is

renaissance Italy, in particular Florence and Venice.
The survival of communal forms of government in these two city-states would
have been impossible without some degree of trust—in this case, not trust in
people but in a principle that purported to transcend human manipulation and,
therefore, corruption. Renaissance republics placed fortuna—the embodiment of
the principle of chance—at the heart of their electoral systems, which, as the
principle means of distributing office, were the beating hearts of communal
politics.95
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Here the idea is that mistrust is the basis of a political will to use lots because an appeal to
Fortune is seen as fair. For Mark Jurdjevic this is evidence of lack of faith in humans and their
choices, and moreover implies a kind of acquiescence to fate.96 This view is in contrast to the
view discussed earlier; that the use of the lot (and the decision to leave choices to chance) is
actually based on the idea is that any human would be capable of carrying out any of these
positions. The use of the lots in Italy at this time as a way to counteract corruption is welldocumented, as is the connection in this context between the lots and fairness (but not as an
expression of divine will).97

However, Jurdjevic’s conclusion that the lot is an apolitical

mechanism because it removes decisions out of the hands of humans is misguided. In agreeing
that any one could equally be chosen for an office, indeed, individuals do give up the choice over
who fulfills the role. More significantly, though, they de-facto consent that any number of people
(or in the case where all people are in the lot, everyone) is capable. In that sense, the lot can be
seen as recognizing the agency of all (relevant) people in their own government, and for that
reason it is indeed political.
Most importantly, though, chance need not and should not be equated with fate or
predetermination. But while it should not be equated with fate in the religious sense, it also
should not be equated with a lack of understanding or knowledge in the secular sense. Gerda
Reith explains that it was in the 17th century that chance begins to be separated from religious
beliefs, but in the process comes to indicate “an absence of knowledge.”98 When chance was
implicated in the religious context it was often dismissed as being predestined or willed by God,
but with the scientific view of the universe, the nomenclature of chance was modified; “From
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being a sacred, it now became an epistemological, category.”99 In this sense, chance represents
only what we don’t understand, not necessarily what we can’t control. The implication is that
perhaps with more study we will understand it, but most certainly it will be something we can
master, or at least master some of the time. A large part of the context that produced this shift was
the rise in probabilistic thinking and the formal discovery of probability theory; the story of
probability, interestingly, is intimately tied to the story of gambling.
Though probability theory developed in mid-seventeenth century, famously by Pascal,100
it was not applied to gambling until Edmond Hoyle in mid-eighteenth century.101 Somewhat
confusingly, though, it is generally acknowledged that gambling gave rise to the development of
probability. The problem is that gambling existed long before the development of probability, so
why wasn’t probability invented prior, since it is from our perspective such an obvious
connection? The related question that has puzzled many people is why Girolamo Cardano came
so close in his Liber de ludo aleae but failed to “invent” probability. For Lambert Williams, the
answer is that in the process of play the experience of and relationship to fortune are quite
different from the rationalizing, scientific approach of probability. Connected with this, Cardano
was more interested in games that required skill but also relied on chance than games of pure
chance.
The notion of probability is easier top read off from games of chance rather than
games of skill—that Cardano would agree is borne out by the fact that most of
his ‘formal chapters’ in which he is calculating odds (roughly speaking, chapters
nine to fifteen) concentrate solely on dicing, and also by the fact that his
discussion of odds in card games has a far more qualitative feel in comparison.102
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The very reason why scholars have seen in Cardano’s work a precursor to probability theory is
that he occasionally theorized games of “pure” chance. For many gamblers, though, the more
interesting challenges come with games that use chance but also require skill; those games in
which individuals can play badly or well. The primary difference for a gambler is the amount of
control one has over the game; in a game of pure chance, none, but in one in which chance is but
one element, some amount of skill can be used even while, as Machiavelli would say, “fortune is
the arbiter of one half our actions.” Chance and free will are not mutually exclusive, but “the
combination of skill and chance in many games, the irregular casting of dice and other gambling
devices, streaks of good and bad luck, and sharp dealing must have all conspired to obscure the
idea of equiprobable outcomes.”103 What most decent gamblers—if they play games of skill—
know is that while one cannot predict or control chance, one can prepare for it. Importantly,
though, no amount of preparation will make the element of chance any more controllable.
However, the myth that we can control chance (through luck charms and such) remains
fairly widespread even after the invention of probability. One scholar highlights the element of
theatre involved.
Just as in earlier times games of chance had functioned as a stage upon which the
favours of the gods were enacted, in the seventeenth century gambling games
once again acted as a stage upon which this time scientific, rather than sacred,
dramas were played out.104
In this way, games of chance offered the opportunity to test theories of certainty, consistently
reaffirming that likelihood could be predicted in the long run. Of course, likelihood is not
prediction, and the fervor with which people claim the scientization of chance may underscore the
elements of both drama and faith that accompany the probabilistic project. Early probability
theorists were often religious and also deeply optimistic about the capacities of individuals to
make sense (and certainty) of the world. Significantly, though,
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In scholastic doctrine, probability—probibilitas—stemmed from opinio, which
referred to propositions resulting from reflection and argument. These could not
be demonstrated and therefore were not considered as valid objects of knowledge
or the focus of scholarly study. Furthermore, since truths about the world were
not considered to be the proper subject of opinio, probability was not viewed as a
realm in which real knowledge would be found.105
This is because propositions about chance would be consistently wrong simply because,
observably, chance regularly eludes our predictions and attempts to control. Of course, it does so
by definition so long as one doesn’t define it in the context of a deterministic worldview.
Again, it is the gambler that categorically experiences the non-deterministic world. On
this view, the gambler (if he or she is any good) also knows how to navigate the non-deterministic
world. “According to Cardano, the gambler did not deify Fortune but regulated her intervention
‘conventionally’ by means of a contract between the players. However, it was still true that to
allow Fortune to work, power had to be conceded to her (i.e., a gambler must risk money and thus
give Fortune the power to deprive him of it) and once invoked the power of Fortune tended to
spread.”106 Far from an absolutist and zero-sum conception of power, this reflects a skill or
methodological approach that both respects chance but knows how to respond to it. One aspect
of this is an approach to chance that does not need to retroactively make it causal. This is a
unique perspective, because as Walker points out there is not the same pressure on the gambler to
make explainable, meaningful, or deterministic the operation of chance as there is on, for
example, the historian.

“In a card game, the effects of Fortune were clear because of the

conventional association between particular outcomes and profit or loss, although the laws which
governed her operation remained systematically irregular.”107

And of course, the laws are

irregular, and no amount of probability theory can either predict or retroactively explain that.
In fact, it is not so much “the gambler” that experiences chance in such an unmediated
way, but rather it is persons participating in the gambling experience. After all, gamblers may
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only experience and process chance in such a non-deterministic way when they are in the
gambling habitus. No doubt, though, some people are more acutely aware of the role of chance in
human affairs, whether gambling or not. The gentry in Virginia in the 18th century for example
were intensely open to chance and “this sensitivity influenced their attitudes toward other men
and society. Virginians knew from bitter experience that despite the best-laid plans, nothing in
their lives was certain.”108 This is at least partly why they were such avid gamblers. Cardano,
then, was not trying to come up with a precise theory of probability, but rather was trying to find
out something useful to the gambler. “What might strike us at first as an obvious tie between
experiential gambling data, practice and the lofty theory of probability begins to unravel. I
suggest that part of the reason that probability as we now think of it failed to emerge in Cardano’s
mind is because of, not in spite of, his practices and experiences in the gambling den.”109 For
Cardano, gambling involves conjectures about the present, not future or even the past.
Conclusion
The importation of the Moral Luck literature to thinking about politics, especially
distributive politics, can lead to fruitful corrections. The use of the concept of luck to critique
“the myth of merit” helps to explain why a theory of democratic politics that takes inequality of
endowment as either natural or desirable overlooks the fundamental lack of control over our own
endowments that we have as humans. The significant characteristic about luck, then, is not its
goodness or badness, but its radical contingency: it cannot be predicted or controlled. In that
sense, luck can be virtually equivalent to Fortune or chance in the sense that it represents that
which humans have no power over. Since it is an ontological feature of the world that there are
those things which we cannot control, the drive for certainty in a theory of politics can be at the
expense of accuracy. Sensitivity to that which we cannot control can, as we’ve shown in this
paper, lead to a more sensitive democratic politics. This sensitivity involves a critique of the
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myth of merit and a recognition that completely agent-centered theories of politics tend to
obscure dynamics over which humans have no control, try as we might. In terms of democratic
political action, though, a sensitivity to luck and chance can open up moments of spontaneity in a
non-deterministic world. For these reasons, we think that a politics of luck should be given more
serious consideration.
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